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PHILADELPHIA'S URBAN HOMESTEADING ORDINANCE:
A POOR BEGINNING TOWARD REOCCUPYING THE
URBAN GHOST TOWN
INTRODUCTION

Whereas, The City of Philadelphia has become owner of certain
properties and ground through abandonment, tax liens, gifts and
other legal processes; and
Whereas, Many of these properties are located in areas which are
blighted, unoccupied, dilapidated and/or economically unproductive;
and
Whereas, In most instances, private or governmental development
of the said vacant ground or structures located thereon is economically unfeasible; and
Whereas, These City-owned ground and structures constitute a high
percentage of total land area which cannot be readily used or sold
by the City; and
Whereas, The constant abandonment and forfeiture of unproductive
ground and structures are creating a severe problem for the City of
Philadelphia in creating blighted, unsightly and ghetto areas .... '
These paragraphs characterize in prefatory language the recently
enacted Urban Homestead Ordinance of July 20, 1978, which essentially reintroduces the historic, emotion-laden concept of "homesteading." 2 The Ordinance is an admission by the City of Philadelphia that
1. Ordinance to Authorize the Creation of The Urban Homestead Board, July 20,
1973, Philadelphia, Pa. [hereinafter cited as Ordinance].
2. The term "homesteading" is often traced to the Federal Homestead Act of 1862,
ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1863), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161 et seq. (1964), which offered
160 acres of free land to anyone who cleared it and remained on it for five years.
Eventually, a quarter of a billion acres were distributed under its provisions. The meaning of urban homesteading is specifically attuned to the geography, politics, and size
of the city considering its adoption. However, all urban homesteading plans contain
provisions to meet four distinct problems: (a) city acquisition of title to transfer abandoned structures to homesteaders; (b) distribution of the structures and criteria for selection of homesteaders; (c) city aid, incentives, or tax exemptions for a specified rehabilitation period; and (d) confirmation of homesteaders' full title upon either selection, partial rehabilitation, or complete rehabilitation. But see note 23 infra.
Urban homesteading is currently being studied in several cities, notably, Wilmington, Delaware, but also Boston, Buffalo, Baltimore, Cleveland, Toronto, and the province
of Nova Scotia. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 1. This note will discuss primarily
the Philadelphia program. The use of analogies between the Wilmington and Philadelphia programs is of limited value. See note 101 infra.
Two bills calling for a federal urban homesteading program have recently been
introduced in the House. H.R. 10706, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10373, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). These bills would establish "a program under which single
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it has thus far failed to enact an orderly and comprehensive program
to conquer urban blight's most mysterious and threatening symptom,
abandonment. Rather than maintain the long-avowed commitment of
government to provide every American with adequate housing, Philadelphia now chooses to foist both the burden of the battle and the
responsibility for its success onto the shoulders of selected citizens. The
Ordinance lacks internal consistency and is critically devoid of provisions for dealing with urban rehabilitation, all of which are necessary
for homesteading's success in the modern urban environment. Thus
the Ordinance cannot effectively cure or even treat the abandonment
dilemma it was supposedly created to alleviate. Furthermore, the Ordinance does not provide its "homesteaders" with the tools and protection necessary to reasonably insure successful rehabilitation. It will
entice hundreds of unwitting lemmings to jump into the sea of financial suicide. This Comment will explore this legislation by examining
its shortcomings in light of the legal and socio-economic conditions
which define and operate on the abandonment process.
I.

THE ORDINANCE: PURPOSE, PROVISIONS AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS

A. Purpose
Many of the estimated 35,000 vacant and dilapidated 3 structures
in Philadelphia 4 unwillingly lapse into municipal ownership as a result of tax delinquencies and subsequent execution of tax liens. It can
family dwellings owned by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development [roughly
250,000] may be conveyed at nominal cost to individuals who will occupy and rehabilitate." Both bills are currently in committee. CCH, CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 4021, 4039
(1974).
3. Dilapidated housing is defined as:
A unit that does not provide safe and adequate shelter and in its present condition endangers the health, safety, or well-being of the occupants. Such
housing has one or more critical defects; or has a combination of intermediate
defects in sufficient number or extent to require considerable repair or rebuilding; or is of inadequate original construction. The defects are either so critical
or so widespread that the structure should be extensively repaired, rebuilt,
or torn down. Examples of critical defects are: holes, open cracks, or rotted,
loose, or missing material (clapboard sidings, shingles, bricks, concrete, tile,
plaster, or floorboards) over a large area of the foundation, walls, roof, floors,
or ceilings; substantial sagging of floors, walls, or roof; and extensive damage
by storm, fire or flood.
1 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, TECIHNIGAL STUDIES,
pt. I, App. B, at 32-33 (1968).
4. Telephone interview with Wait Johnson, Deputy Managing Director for Housing, City of Philadelphia, Oct. 15, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Interview).
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safely be predicted that many structures now remaining in private
hands will follow the same path off the city's tax registry rolls and onto
the rolls of vacant, unproductive municipal land. 5 The city is slowly
becoming its own worst slumlord because it lacks the capacity and the
financial ability either to maintain or rehabilitate these unwanted properties. To avoid both political embarrassment and municipal tort liability arising from frequent fires and crumbling structures, practical
considerations demand the demolition of even sound structures.
Joseph Coleman, Philadelphia city councilman, dubbed these
jungle-type areas where abandonment was greatest as the city's "New
Frontier"" because of their sparse population and economic unproductivity. To deal with the ills of the "New Frontier," Coleman suggested
returning to the old frontier for an "adaptation of an old and proven
concept" 7 -homesteading. The federal Homestead Act of 18628 rewarded the pioneer who would risk his life and limb in the frontier
environment by awarding him free land, the "value of which he and
the community would create." 9 The act served as an incentive to improve the land by both freeing capital for improvements and removing
the specter of burdensome mortgages. Utilizing the beneficial results of
the Homestead Act of 1862 as his model, Councilman Coleman envisioned the reclamation of the American city, replete with psychological manifestations:
Conceivably, thousands of people would resettle on the Frontiers,
and thousands of properties would eventually be returned to the tax
roll. In addition, our cities would become stable. But perhaps most
important of all would be the new sense of pride and dignity that
would come from owning a part of and having a stake in One's own
[sic] City and Nation.10
Although Councilman Coleman is to be commended for his idealism, it is necessary to differentiate between his visionary aspirations for
5. Id.
6. Councilman Coleman was the first councilman to issue a position paper calling
for a homestead ordinance. A copy of this paper is on file in the Buffalo Law Review
office, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence
[hereinafter cited as Coleman].
7. Id. at 5.

8. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161 et
seq. (1970).
9. Gates, The Homestead Act: Free Land Policy in Operation, in LAND USE POLICY
AND PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

10. Coleman 5.

28 (H. Ottoson ed. 1963).
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the program and the more realistic results that can be expected. Surely
Mr. Coleman is not to be understood to be sponsoring urban homesteading as a program that will single-handedly reverse and eliminate
the cyclical process that yields abandoned houses. Realistically, Coleman must see homesteading as only another potential weapon in an
arsenal of government programs. If Philadelphia, a city which has run
the gamut of federal, state, and local programs aimed at eliminating its
slums, 11 has turned to homesteading to eradicate or even arrest the
growth of abandonment, it will without doubt be disappointed. The
Homestead Ordinance must be viewed for exactly what it is: a plan
to place parcels of city-owned land in private hands at nominal cost
in exchange for assurances that the new owner will rehabilitate his
property to a tolerable level of code compliance.' 2 If used in conjunction with revisions in existing law, supporting programs, and active
support from the business community, it could at least prevent salvageable housing from deteriorating past the point of no return.
B. General Provisions of the Ordinance
The Urban Homestead Ordinance authorizes the Mayor to create
an 11 member Urban Homestead Board to administer its program.' 8
The non-governmental composition of the Board is required to consist
of the following: an architect, a contractor, a member of the Buildings
Trade Council, a clergyman, a representative of a savings and loan
association, and at least one member of the body politic. 14 These
11. For a study of the housing situation in Philadelphia from the Civil War
through the 1960's, see C. ABRAMS, HoME OWNERSHIP FOR THE POOR (1970). For a
history of all federal programs available to American cities up to 1968, see THE REPORT
OF THE PRESmENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME, pt. II, at
54-68 (1968).

For an update on programs since 1968 and a comparative analysis of

major pending legislation concerning housing assistance programs, see Nenno, Administration and Congress Chart Divergent Courses for Future Federal Housing Assistance,

9 J.
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427, 429-34 (1973). For a more specific discussion of programs dealing

with rehabilitation, see Armstrong, Rehabilitation-Conservation-Preservation,New Ap-

proaches to an Old Idea, HUD CHALLENGE, Mar. 1973, at 2, 3-5. For a more polemic
analysis, see M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964).
12. See Ordinance. Code compliance is defined as "such work as is necessary to
restore the structure to safe and sanitary maintenance and repair. In general, this means
the building would be in compliance with all building, housing, fire, and sanitary codes
of the City ....
" D. LiSTOKIN, THE DYNAMICS OF HOUSING REHABILITATION 5 n.8
(1973).
13. Ordinance § 1.
14. Id. § 2.
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appaintees are to serve on a staggered basis without compensation. 15
In addition, two city councilmen are to serve on the Board as well
as the Deputy Managing Director for Housing, the Executive Director of the Redevelopment Authority, and the Executive Director of
Philadelphia's Planning Commission.' 6 The Board is to have a budget
of $500,00017 and is empowered to hire a staff to "prepare regulations
'
to implement the purposes and spirit of urban homesteading."'
The principal section of the Ordinance, section six, makes the
Board responsible for cataloging all city-owned, vacant structures and
lots as either appropriate or inappropriate for use in the homesteading
program.' The Board may recommend to the City Law Department
that foreclosure proceedings be initiated against the owner of any
usable but abandoned structure which is still in private hands. 20 As
for the unusable structures in private hands, the Board may recommend that the Department of Licenses and Inspections initiate public
21
nuisance proceedings with a view towards demolition.
Under the homesteading program, the Board, with the assistance
of the Department of Public Lands, is to recommend to the City Council that it establish "Homesteading Areas" and transfer land and title in
23
these areas to approved applicants. In exchange for their property,
these recipients must tender a contractual agreement to build "on approved ground or rehabilitate approved structures to building and
housing code standards, beginning said building or rehabilitation no
later than sixty [60] days after title has been acquired . . . ."4 In addition, the applicant must covenant to live on the land for at least five
years. 25 As an incentive to attract applicants, the Board shall recom15. Id. §§ 3-4.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 8.
18. Id. § 5. The section also states that no regulation shall become effective without prior approval of the City Law Department.
19. Id. § 6(A).

20. Id. § 6(B).
21. Id. § 6(C).
22. Id. § 6(K).
23. The Ordinance is unclear as to when title is transferred in fee to the homesteader. The original Federal Homestead Act did not allow for transfer of title in fee
until the covenants of occupancy and improvement were satisfied, at which point the
owner would be issued a certificate of patent. The Ordinance seems to imply a similar
process. Id. § 6(I). Wait Johnson points out that the Board will probably convey full
title at the time of occupancy stressing the owner's inability to obtain mortgage assistance
without title in fee. Interview.
24. Ordinance §§ 6(E) (4), (F) (a). But cf. id. § 6(I).

25. Id. §§ 6(E)(5), (F) (b).
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mend that homesteaders who are in the process of rehabilitating their
newly acquired property be exempted by the Department of Licenses
and Inspections from the enforcement of certain sections of the Housing Code 2 6 Furthermore, the Board shall recommend to the City Council that the homesteaders be freed from the obligation of paying real
property tax on the assessed valuation of the improvements to the
grounds or structure 2 7 Hence, not only is the new property owner to
be immune from full code enforcement procedures, but he is also to
be relieved for a limited time from the duty of paying taxes for the
value which accumulates from his labors.
In addition to entering into the covenant mentioned above, an
applicant must pass basic "filtering" criteria. Before becoming a homesteader, each aspiring candidate must (1) be over 21 years of age
or the head of a family; 2 (2) be an American citizen or must have
legally declared his intentions to become one;29 (3) display either
financial ability or construction proficiency necessary to rehabilitate the
structure to code requirements.8 0
The approval hearing is not intended to be a mere rubber stamp
operation; the Board is to play an active role in matching applicants
with approved structures and in arriving at reasonable rehabilitation
schedules. 31 The Board is further empowered to assist applicants in
obtaining financial aid where necessary.3 2 Such assistance was essential to Councilman Coleman's concept of the Board as a coordinator
for the applicant's dealings with financial institutions and federally
funded programs. 33
The Homestead program has not progressed very far although the
Mayor has selected the Board members. As of October, 1973, the full
26. Id. § 6(D).
27. Id. § 6(J). This section states that the exemption is in accordance with Act No.
34 of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For a discussion of
this Act, see notes 40-51 infra & accompanying text.
28. Ordinance § 6(E)(1).
29. Id. § 6(B)(2).
30. Id. § 6(E) (3). One editorial has claimed that Philadelphia will require the
family to demonstrate sufficient financial ability to invest at least $8,000 in rehabilitation or have the necessary skills to carry out rehabilitation for less. Preservation News,
Oct. 1973, at 4, col. 1. Wilmington authorities are looking for applicants with an income
of $6,000-$10,000 with no more than six children. Urban Homesteading, MUNICIPAL
ATT'Y, Oct. 1973, at 196.
31. Ordinance § 6(F).
32. Id. § 6(H).
33. Coleman 4. Coleman had in mind a program providing mortgages guaranteed
through the Federal National Mortgage Association.
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Board had met only once and merely got acquainted. 34 To date, no
regulations or administrative procedures have been suggested or approved. Despite this lack of Board activity, a virtual "Homestead
fever" has arisen among the populace. The Board's telephones are
continuously busy with requests for information and applications,
and inquiries are streaming into every agency associated with housing. 35
C. The Legal Basis for the Ordinance
The property tax exemption offered by the Ordinance is clearly

its most effective incentive. The authorization for that power can be
traced from the Pennsylvania Constitution to the laws of the General

Assembly which define the power to exempt from taxation in terms of
specified purposes, amounts and time periods.36
Article VIII, section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits

the exemption from taxes of all property not specifically enumerated
under that article.8 7 Prior to 1968, "the constitution was silent as to

exemptions for rehabilitative improvements to existing structures or
reconstruction on vacant grounds. A homesteading concept Offered

under such conditions would have presumably operated under a fatal
hardship as the homesteader would have been penalized through higher
taxes for all improvements which increased the structure's market

value. On April 28, 1968, a constitutional amendment provided the
exemption necessary to avoid such tax consequences. Added to article
VIII was a subsection which allows the General Assembly to statutor-

ily grant tax relief for a limited period of time by way of an exemption
for improvements to deteriorating properties. 38 A subsequent subsec34. Interview.

35. Id.
36. All property in Pennsylvania is subject to tax only by the local government
units. E.g., 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020(201) (1968); see W. NnwHousF, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE- TAXATION 465 n.12 (1959); Tanner,
Constitutional Limitations of the Taxing Power in Pennsylvania, 7 U. PITT. L. REv. 98,
112 (1941). As such, real property taxation is left to the municipal authorities subject
to the general provisions of the General Assembly. While taxation rates are established by
local governments and their subunits (such as boroughs and school districts), exemptions
are in the sole province of the legislature. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5020(201) (1968).
37. PA. CONST. art. 8, § 5 reads: "All laws exempting property from taxation,
other than the property above enumerated shall be void."
38. PA. CONST. art. 8, § 2(b) (iii) reads as follows:
The General Assembly may, by law:
Establish standards and qualifications by which a local taxing authority
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tion allows similar tax relief for those lots whose value appreciated
through new residential construction. 0
On July 9, 1971, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act
No. 3440 pursuant to the constitutional amendment. This statute permits the municipal taxing authority, by way of an ordinance or resolution, to exempt from the real property tax that portion of the assessed
value which represents improvements to deteriorated properties or to
exempt all properties within a deteriorated neighborhood. 41 The
statute defines deteriorated property as any unit certified to be "unfit
for human habitation" for the purposes of "health," "welfare," or
"rent withholding"; or certified to be "vacant, condemned, or demolished by reason of noncompliance with laws, ordinances, or regulations." 42 Under this rigorous definition, housing which is not within a
certified deteriorated neighborhood and is merely unattractive or in the
early stages of deterioration, as well as most inhabited structures, cannot qualify for tax benefits. While these considerations are perhaps
irrelevant to the Homestead Ordinance, in that all structures involved
are city-owned and presumed vacant, such exclusions serve no useful
function in eradicating urban decay or retarding abandonment. The
rather strict definition penalizes those owners of structures who have
fought a long, hard battle to keep their property within the code by
43
depriving them of the benefits of exemptions given homesteaders.
Under the Act's provisions all types of dwelling units qualify for
tax exemption including houses, apartments, and any other "group of
may make uniform special tax provisions applicable to a taxpayer for a limited
period of time to encourage improvement of deteriorating property or areas
by an individual, association or corporation ....
39. PA. CONST.art. 8, § 2(b) (iv) reads as follows:
The General Assembly may, by law:

[M]ake special tax provisions on any increase in the value of real estate resulting from residential construction. Such special provisions shall be applicable
for a period not to exceed two years.

Id.
40. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 4711 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
41. The procedure and criteria for designating an area a "deteriorated" neighborhood is also set forth in this act. Id. § 4713.
42. Id. § 4712(1).
43. The question here is not the constitutional issue of the uniformity of taxation, for such classifications have always been legally permissible. Rather, the question
is essentially one of renovating neighborhoods in a fair and equitable manner. "It is
too late in the day in Pennsylvania to question the power of the legislature to classify
subjects of taxation on broad lines and within certain limitations." Jermyn v. Scranton,
212 Pa. 598, 602, 62 A. 29, 31 (1905).
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rooms intended for the use of occupancy by a family. '44 Although the
Ordinance refers only to "structures" or "property," 45 it is presumed
46
that its tax benefits apply to both single and multiple dwellings.
An adjustable scale limiting the amount of expenditures which
will be tax-exempt is also provided by the Act.47 Although the upper

limit was fixed at $10,000 for improvements in 1971, future years are
to be calculated by multiplying the maximum exemption allowable by
law for the previous year by the Census Bureau's New One-family
House Price Index for the current year. Therefore, as essential housing
costs rise, so will the ceiling for tax exemptions.
The Act establishes territorial limitations which a city must utilize in order to grant the contemplated benefits. Only such areas as
the municipality specifically finds to be deteriorated neighborhoods
shall qualify for the exemption benefits. 48 At least one public hearing
on the proposed boundaries of the neighborhood shall precede the
authority's decision. The final decision shall be based on such criteria
as overcrowded buildings, a disproportionate number of tax delinquent properties, impoverishment," socially undesirable land-use, defective or obsolete building design, blight,50 and general standards of
safety and health.
Two alternative time schedules for the tax exemptions were created by Act No. 84. At its discretion, the taxing authority may provide
for exemptions to run for either five or ten years. 51 Under the five year
plan, the homesteader would be totally exempt for the first year from
all taxes attributable to improvements. In each of the following four
years he would lose 20 percent of his exemption. The ten year plan
works on an identical principle: an initial year of total tax exemption
44. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4712(2)

(Supp. 1974). Act. No. 34 defines "improve-

ment" as
repairs, construction, or reconstruction, including alterations and additions,

having the effect of rehabilitating a structure so that it becomes habitable ...
or is brought into compliance with laws ...ordinary upkeep and maintenance
shall not be deemed an improvement.
Id. § 4712(3).
45. E.g., Ordinance § 6(A)-(E).
46. It will be interesting to monitor the program to see whether homestead cooperatives or condominiums will be established. The state laws and the Ordinance
would appear to allow such arrangements.
47. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4714(b) (Supp. 1974).
48. Id. § 4713(a).
49. As set forth in 62 id. §§ 2081 et seq.
50. 35 id. §§ 1701 et seq.
51. 72 id. § 4714(a).
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followed by a 90 percent tax exemption in the second year with a subsequent decrease of ten percent for each of the remaining eight years.
II. ABANDONMENT: THE PROBLEM THE ORDINANCE Is DIRECTED
AGAINST

Although authorities have disagreed over the definition and extent of abandonment, 52 all concur that it is not the mere incident of
an owner walking away from his property. Abandonment must be
viewed as a dynamic process beginning years before the physical relinquishment of the premises. Abandonment of vacant and dilapidated
structures is but the effect of a complete prior monetary and moral
disinvestment from the central city. Urbanologist George Sternlieb's
often-quoted definition indicates that abandonment
is the avoidance of any liability and the rejection of any responsibility
for a structure as it ceases to be of immediate economic benefit to the
53
title holder.

Thus, the building becomes abandoned not when it is fully and permanently vacant, but rather at the point in time when the owner decides
against code compliance or payment of taxes.5 4 Sternlieb's formulation
focuses on the moment at which the factors favoring disinvestment
outweigh factors favoring investment.
Besides examining abandonment's relationship to events on par52.
Part of the problem in discussing abandonment is the vagueness of the
term itself. Most census reports and other statistical compilations do not list
abandonments per- se. Rather, such buildings often fall under the "unrecorded
loss" category, which also includes some fires and building collapses. Another
reason for the unavailability of precise figures in this area is the lack of objective criteria to indicate when a building can be considered abandoned. It
could be when the landlord stops providing essential services, or when he stops
paying taxes or collecting rents, or when the tenants vacate the building. We
now have the added difficulty of classifying apartment houses which are legally
empty but where "squatters" have taken up occupancy.
Statement of Neal J. Hardy, Assistant Administrator of Programming and Policy, N.Y.C.
Housing and Development Administration, I Hearings on Housing and Urban Development Legislation of 1970 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 803 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1 Hearings].
53. Quoted in Weinstein, Abandoned Housing: Cities Consuming Themselves, 3
REAL ESTATE REv. 108 (1973).

54. Sternlieb, Abandoned Housing: What Is To Be Done?, URBAN LAND, Mar.
1972, at 3, 5.
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ticular properties, it is also necessary that it be viewed as a function of
public noticeability. There is no "abandonment problem" until the
community recognizes an intolerable condition, either in terms of
concentrated areas of vacant structures or in the encroachment of
abandonment into new areas. Normally, abandonment represents a predictable and desirable event in the housing cycle known as "filtering."55
As new construction provides improved dwelling units at all levels of
the economy, distasteful housing is left behind. Thus, as middle income
housing becomes available, the least appetizing of the middle income
housing is left behind as homeowners generally filter upwards. That
housing is subsequently claimed by those emanating from the upper
ranks of the low income units, in turn freeing their dwellings for those
deserting the least desirable lower income lodging. Through this constant process of filtration, the most undesirable lower income housing
is left vacant. Under optimum conditions, such areas should become
prime areas of new construction after a short period of stagnation.
However, recently abandonment has ignored the traditional filtration
process, occurring not only to the most dilapidated housing, but also
to dwellings which were in good condition a relatively short time
ago. 0 Buildings which complied with the housing code and were not
in tax arrears three years ago are inexplicably today vacant and
crumbling-5 7 Abandonment's newborn irrationality and lightning
swiftness have provoked public outcry.
Widespread abandonment is not related to the filtering process
which occurred during the Depression.58 That occurrence was a direct
result of, and therefore as reversible as, the Depression itself. However, some authorities believe that thie contemporary abandonment
crisis has a quality of irreversibility because of its overwhelming magnitude.5 9 For example, as of 1970, New York City had 18,000 abandoned multiple dwellings and lost $200 million in unpaid real estate
taxes.60 This figure includes 200,000 apartment units capable of hous55. F.

PENNANCE,

HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS AND POLICY

21 (1969); Sternlieb,

supra note 54, at 6.

56. Annual loss of units in New York City is greatest in sectors termed sound as
opposed to sectors deemed deteriorated or dilapidated. F. KRiSTOF, HOUSING: THE EcoNOmIC FACETS OF NEw YORK CrrYI's PROBLEMS 13-14 (1970).
57. See, e.g., statement of Neal J. Hardy, 1 Hearings 809, 813.
58. Sternlieb, supra note 54, at 4.
59. Id.

60. Statement of Raymond Gallani, Chairman, Federation of Lower and Middle
Income Property Owners, 1 Hearings 931.
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ing over 700,000 people. 6' Even more alarming is the fact that the pace
of abandonment in New York City is accelerating. During the four
year interval from 1960 to 1964, 15,000 buildings were abandoned,
02
while between 1965 and 1967, almost 23,000 structures were vacated.
Any attempt to construct a set of hypotheses to explain the causes
or operation of the contemporary abandonment process must be preceded by a caveat; as yet there is no empirical data with which to test
the theories offered. Students of abandonment must therefore resign
themselves to the inconclusive nature of their findings. These remarks
constitute the standard confession found in most treatments of the subject.6 3 Yet if we are to effectively understand this crisis, it is critical to
61. Statement of William A. Moses, 1 Hearings 913, 914. The replacement cost
for providing adequate housing for these people is $6 billion.
62. Statement of former Senator Charles E. Goodell, 1 Hearings 842, 843. This
predicament is not unique to New York City. Other cities claim proportional abandonment crises:
a. Washington, D. C.
7,500 vacant buildings
Statement of Senator Edward W. Brooke, 1 Hearings 793, 794.
b. Boston
1,300 vacant structures
3,000 dwelling units
Statement of Francis W. Gens, Commissioner of Housing Inspection, Boston, Mass., 1
Hearings 889.
c. Philadelphia
35,000 structures
(up 21,000 from 1968)
Interview.
d. Baltimore
4,000 structures in 1970

(increase 1,000/yr.)
Statement of Robert Emery, Commissioner of Housing and Community Development,
Baltimore, Md., 1 Hearings 796.
e. Detroit
2,000-3,000 buildings
Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 810.
f. Houston
7,500 buildings
Id.
g. Cleveland
2,400 buildings
Id.
h. Buffalo
3,000 buildings
Statement of Hon. Stanley Makowski, Mayor of the City of Buffalo, N.Y., June 1, 1973.
63.
We still do not fully comprehend the mechanisms at work here. ...
We know very little about the phenomenon of abandoned structures. The
reality has outrun the scholarly apparatus. There has been very little research
done on this situation, and even the very definition of the phenomenon is far
from precise.
Sternlieb, supranote 54, at 4-5.
Part of the problem in discussing abandonment is the vagueness of the
term itself.
[To the best of my knowledge, there has been no formal study to date of the
various forces behind the rapid increase in housing abandonment. . . . My
comments will be directed to urban abandonment where even a minimal
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construct a scenario from historical and social events which depicts the
circumstances underlying the geometric increase in the number of
abandoned buildings in the 1970's.04
The central city65 can be viewed historically as a staging depot for
immigrants.6 6 The urban core of the city was the point of arrival for
the thousands of immigrants who came to this country over the last
century and a half. It was the logical settling area, being the closest to
the commercial and industrial districts of the city and one where jobs
were most readily available to the untrained and the uneducated. 67 The
inner city was also the natural location for newcomers to assimilate
American values and norms. 68
The dwellings these immigrants occupied were substandard, and
as soon as they were financially able to, they took advantage of the
filtering process and acquired improved lodging in other parts of
town. Nevertheless new waves of immigrants readily filled the substandard housing left behind. 69 Owners promptly paid their taxes and
maintained their property because continued immigration insured
perennial tenants. Substantial sums were expended on maintenance in
order to increase the longevity of the structure. Where filtering left
a dangerous and delapidated structure unrentable or unsaleable, it was
most often razed and a new structure erected in its place.
After the Second World War, the sociological structure supporting the central city collapsed -as quotas restricted European immigration. The composition of the immigrants to the inner city began to
shift primarily to southern and Caribbean Blacks. Those European
ethnic groups remaining in the central city at the War's close steadily
elevated themselves to a higher housing level. 70 The post-War building
boom and the subsequent growth of suburbia virtually guaranteed
their finding adequate housing elsewhere. The central city thus was
destined to become today's black ghetto.71
acquaintance with sociology and economics go [sic] a long way in explaining
the current crisis.

Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 810-11.
64. Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 803.
65. The central city is that part of the city that eventually became the urban core

ghetto.
66. Sternlieb, supra note 54, at 4.

67. Weinstein, supra note 53, at 109.
68. Sternlieb, supra note 54, at 4.
69.

Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 811.

70. Statement of the Ripon Society, Washington, D.C. Chapter, 1 Hearings 952.
71. Id. at 952-53.
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When the central city ceased to function as a staging area, the
isolation of the black ghetto was complete. As commerce and industry began to relocate further out in the suburbs,72 the city was no
longer a place where a newcomer could absorb American tradition,
thus the unassimilated ghetto dweller remained aloof from the main73
stream of American life.

As the urban ghetto became increasingly a black ghetto, landowners grasped at profits that could be gleaned from a social group
that had no hopes of escape. They increased the occupancy of their
dwellings without regard to the building's original structural capacity
and further augmented profits by both raising the rents and lowering
the standard of maintenance.7 4 Costs were cut by doing without such
necessities as competent electrical and sewage disposal systems, and
almost all rehabilitative work was done only on the exterior of the
building. As these rented units deteriorated, the homeowners in the
area could literally read the handwriting on the wall: get out at any
cost.7 5 This they did; some ghetto dwellers fled to the fringes of the

black community, a privileged few fled to the suburbs, while others
moved into federally funded housing projects.
As these trends continued, structures varying from excellent to
abominable came to be held by speculators.7 6 They offered an endless
72. Sternlieb, supra note 54, at 4; Weinstein, supra note 53, at 109.
73. Statement of Neal Hardy, I Hearings 811; Weinstein, supra note 53, at 109.
Whether this isolation was patently because of racial differences is speculative. Some
authors maintain that any ethnic group heretofore alien to the American life style, which
characteristically lacked training, education and the financial ability to take advantage
of new construction, would have been similarly trapped in the ghetto.
74. Statement of Francis W. Gens, 1 Hearings 842.
75. Id.
76. It is necessary to distinguish between the two types of speculators. One seeks
profits in land only as a function of projected land-use policy. For example, the speculator will buy vacant land in an underdeveloped area predicting that eventual development will increase-the market -value -of this land. The other category of speculator is
more interested in the short-range usage of the land and structure. Primarily, his profits
lie in either quick resale to potential landlords and home buyers, or his own utilization of the building as a multiple dwelling.
The land-use speculator's technique was simple. First he would approach owners
in a white area on the fringe of the black community with warnings that the ghetto
was slowly expanding towards them. He offered the apprehensive homeowner a "now
or never" cash offer for his property in the light of an imminent drop in present prop.
erty value. The dwellings purchased at this reduced value were then resold to black
families at an inflated market price. The land-use speculator then repeated this scheme
with the next threatened neighborhood, staying far enough ahead of sales so that the
artificially created panic appeared genuine.
The other subclass of speculators began acquiring for use as income producing
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variety of housing for sale or rent to a wide range of income groups
in the ghetto, and what remained non-income producing was left to
rot. Speculators could afford to hold onto these vacant structures for
a period of years at little or no cost to themselves, awaiting handsome
condemnation awards in the wake of urban renewal projects. Others
relied on federal home-improvement programs carrying low interest
rates to decrease the costs of rehabilitation, and to maximize their
profits by making buildings habitable. But in most cases, when the
speculator's ship did not come in, the buildings simply deteriorated.
Faced with the rising cost of maintaining income-producing property,77 and with diminishing returns on housing investments, many
property, houses left behind by the black families. Since no other competitor could
afford to renovate the structures, these properties were acquired at reduced costs. The
speculator could easily outbid the potential black buyer trying to take advantage of
the filtering process to find better housing for himself and his family. This resulted as
most financial institutions, denied .applications for conventional mortgages within the
black ghetto, thus securing the position of those with fluid cash. Whatever the speculator paid for the structure was passed along to his tenants and future buyer.
77. Robert Embry submitted this demonstrative table:
Illustrative Cash Flow Statement: Inner-City Row House Held Free and
Clear, Baltimore, 1968
Gross income $76 per month x 12
$912
Less: Vacancies and arrears (13 percent)
120
Effective income: (1)

Less:
Real estate taxes
Liability insurance
Fire insurance
Total fixed expenses
Operating income

(2)

125
75
40
240
252

Less:
Maintenance and repairs
Water and Sewage charges

240
60

Miscellaneous

10

Total operating expenses

310

Net income before management
Less: Management (10 percent collected rent)

242
79

Net income from operations
(3)
$163
(1) Assumes assessed value of land and building is $2,500.
(2) If ground rent on land valued at $1,000 is capitalized at 6 percent, annual
payment of lessee would be $60, thus increasing fixed expenses to $300
and reducing net income from operations to $103. Moreover, if property
were subject to a $2,000, 10-year mortgage at 8 percent, monthly debt
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landowners decided to liquidate their holdings. The process of disinvestment began initially when they failed to pay real property tax.
Health and building codes were then grossly ignored as replacement or
repair of deteriorated mechanical and structural elements was forsaken.
The property was eventually claimed by the city in lieu of the withheld property taxes. If the building was unoccupied before the foreclosure, the property owner simply salvaged what he could, locked the
door and walked away. However, by this point many owners had already obfuscated their ownership7 8 and as few cities had the manpower
or ambition to successfully track down the true owner, the city was
compelled to assume ownership.

City proprietorship is the general rule following an owner's desertion. After a fixed statutory period, the city initiates an in rem proceeding, in which it may foreclose on the property for the amount of
the back taxes. It will then hold periodic auctions of the properties
service would be $24.62 a month, or $291.12 a year; annual cash loss
would be $128.12.
(3) Assuming market value equals assessed value, and that property was
purchased at this price, return on the investment is 6.5 percent.
1 Hearings 799-800. Furthermore, in the years since this statement, expenses have risen
sharply:
Average Annual Increases in Operating Expenses: 1965-69
Item
Percent
Insurance
11.4
Wages and salaries
7.2
Real estate taxes
4.96
Management
4.3
Plumbing
4.0
Painting
3.6
Fuel and oil
3.4
Gas and electricity
1.0
Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 812.
78. For example, a building once owned by a single person may be transferred, on
the day before court action, to a corporation whose assets are limited to the value of the
abandoned property. While this transaction will not aid the previous owner to evade
usually small fines for code violations, it will release him from any future obligations or
liability for the property. Another popular device is the quit-claim deed, which as in the
case of any deed, only the grantor must sign. Through the filing of a quit-claim deed,
many actual owners transferred legal ownership to any of the following: a dissolved corporation, a prisoner or indigent without his knowledge, a resident in another state who
may or may not exist, or a bogus tax-exempt foundation. The details concerning hidden
ownership were gathered by this author through personal experience. As a member of
a task force given charge of locating the owners of 3,000 vacant and dilapidated
buildings in the City of Buffalo, the author gained firsthand knowledge of these tactics
over several hundred investigations. The task force was under the supervision of the
Buffalo Corporation Counsel, Anthony Manguso, and property investigators Charles
Roessler and Steven Mirando. See generally Buffalo Evening News, June 18, 1973, at
13, col. 6.
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acquired to recapture its losses. For the most part the abandoned properties remain unsold and the city is forced to retain them.7 9 The city as
landowner does little more for the property and the neighborhood than
the speculators. Generally the buildings, while possibly structurally
sound, are not habitable due to pillaging, vandalism and the elements.
Most municipal landlords eventually either tear down the buildings or
board them up while awaiting state or federal rehabilitation aid.
With a rudimentary understanding of the basic process behind
abandonment, Neil Harding's contention becomes comprehensible.
[W]e are up against a contagious self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, an
owner, sensing the beginning of a neighborhood's decline will be loathe
to rehabilitate since an isolated renovation in an area of 'encroaching
deterioration' will be botV futile and financially disastrous ...
[W]hen bad buildings are vacated, the other owners begin to panic
and good houses in the vicinity are abandoned at the same time.80
Those slum dwellers who continue to remain in the deteriorated
neighborhoods face a plethora of hazards endemic to abandonment.
The constant threat of fire, intentional or otherwise, is so great in these
areas 81 that most insurance companies refuse to issue policies on buildings in the vicinity. Those companies that continue to insure against
fire charge exorbitant rates which put such coverage beyond the reach
of most residents in the area. 82 The specter of crime also looms heavily
over the resident, as these abandoned buildings become a haven for
fugitives, vandals and addicts. Although already stripped clean of
usable material,8 3 transients and outcasts seek shelter in the structures,
79. Recently, cities in the process of auctioning tax-delinquent lands have required
the presence of a city appraiser, whose duty it is to outbid early offers until a reasonable
price is proffered. Thus, bidders acting in concert are unable to successfully purchase
properties at prices not acceptable to the city. Id.
80. Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 813.
81. In New York City, despite the fact that vacant structures comprise less than
one half of one percent of the housing stock, they account for 11 percent of all fires
and 27 percent of all serious fires. Id. at 813. In Boston, almost 20 percent of all
"structural fires"
occur in vacant buildings. Statement of Francis W. Gens, 1 Hearings
880. In Buffalo, the two percent of the housing stock that is vacant accounts for 10
percent of all fires. Telephone interview with Lt. John Lewandowski, Department of
Fire Prevention, Buffalo, New York, Dec. 5, 1973.
82. Insurance rates in certain neighborhoods in New York City have risen 200300 percent from 1965-69. 1 Hearings 812.
83. Eye witnesses have reported a house vacant for only 12 hours to have been
completely vandalized of all salvageable material. Interview with Mr. Theodore Green,
in Buffalo, New York, Oct. 15, 1973.
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teenage gangs convert them into "headquarters," and arsonists find
them ideal targets.8 4
The psychological damage done to residents in an area where
abandonment is prevalent can also be severe.85 Children must grow up
in an environment of rodents, broken glass, open trash and debris, and
bear the ever-present danger of collapsible floors and walls. Accidents
and death are daily occurrences and the paranoia that accompanies
them is limitless. As bad as conditions are in the daylight, the night
converts each such building into a haven for muggers and rapists,
forcing the wiser residents to stay locked in their dwellings from dusk
to dawn. Thus it is not surprising that a national magazine compares
the effects of abandonment in the central city to that of wartime aerial
bombardment."8
The urge to escape the ghetto is made all the more imperative by
the social ills that abandonment breeds. George Sternlieb has labelled
such areas as neighborhoods that can only be fled from. 7 Furthermore,
abandonment generates an insatiable demand for habitable housing,
which simply cannot be met. 8
III.

IMPACT OF THE URBAN HOrMfESTEADING ORDINANCE

With a working knowledge of the provisions of the Ordinance and
a hypothesis concerning the forces it is supposed to counteract, one can
proceed to examine whether the Ordinance will (A) blunt the pace
of abandonment and eradicate the social factors which feed it, or (B)
provide the homesteaders who have contractually obligated themselves
84. Francis Gens offered the following six month study in Boston's south end:
[Flor the six-month period between January and June of 1969-1,431 arrests
were made in and around vacant buildings of the area. Over 1,000 of these
arrests were for drunkenness. But more serious crimes were also committed:
246 arrests for narcotics violations were made;
25 vice arrests;
26 arrests for larceny;
19 arrests of juveniles;
10 arrests for assault and battery; and
1 murder.
1 Hearings at 890.
85. One lady reported not sleeping for several days at a time due to a fear that
the vacant structure next door would be set afire, as the dwelling had twice previously
caught fire in a one-month period.
86. Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 813.
87. Quoted in UR3AN AMERICA INC., THE ILL-HOuSED 26 (1970).
88. Statement of Neal Hardy, 1 Hearings 843. Statement of Francis Gens, 1
Hearings 889.
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to the city with enough support to succeed. Unfortunately, it must be
concluded that Philadelphia's Urban Homestead Ordinance will not
succeed at either. First, the analogy between the Federal Homesteading
Act, which catered to pioneers, and the Philadelphia Homestead Ordinance, designed to aid the city-dweller, is of limited application.
Secondly, the Ordinance will not stem the thrust towards speculation
in the central city. Hence the Ordinance will not effectively prevent or
reduce abandonment to any significant degree. Finally, the incentives
and safeguards provided by the Ordinance are illusory. The disadvantages of this program to the homesteader outweigh its advantages.
A. ProbableImpact on the Growth of Abandonment
1. The Homestead Concept. The Homestead Act of 1862 addressed an altogether different problem than Philadelphia's, in that it
attempted to provide free land to the middle and lower income classes.
At that time public land was being bought in large tracts from the
government by speculators who eventually sold it back to the masses
in smaller lots at exorbitant prices. To meet the vocal demands of the
non-competitive settlers who wished only single parcels, the government sacrificed enormous profits on valuable land by circumventing
the traditional market place.8 9 The situation in Philadelphia is the
antithesis because the city is desperately trying to rid itself of property
it cannot sell through the conventional market. While the pioneer received valuable land, the city-dweller will receive the poorest land in
the most undesirable parts of the city.
Basic to the conceptual differences between homesteading as originated and as applied in Philadelphia is a dichotomy between the independence of the pioneer homesteader from government services and
the dependence of-the Philadelphia homesteader-on municipal and
regional services. Certainly Councilman Coleman inaccurately analogizes the urban landscape to the frontier where the pioneer carved
out a home for his family in the virgin timberlands or prairies. The
pioneer was totally on his own; water, heat, sewage facilities, roads,
structurally sound buildings, and security from crime and fire were
provided only to the extent the pioneer was willing to provide for them
himself. The urban homesteader, however, must rely on the county
89. See LeDuc, History and Appraisal of U.S. Land Policy to 1862, in LAND
3, 25-27 (H. Ottoson ed. 1963).
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and municipal governments for basic support. The homesteader will be
asked to start rehabilitation in an area of high crime, poor schools,
and frequent fires, where hundreds of vacant houses exist and where
previous attempts to renovate or improve the neighborhood have
proven "economically unfeasible." He will also be almost powerless to
protect himself from these circumstances.9 0 Unlike the Congress in
1862, Philadelphia must provide coterminous assurances that the city
will meet the expectations and needs of its newest residents for adequate security, health and education. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the
"preferred" 91 applicant will be induced to apply once he is fully apprised of the situation. The Federal Homestead Act of 1862 provided
a "golden opportunity" to all comers while the Philadelphia Ordinance, as it stands, offers applicants who are willing to be slum-dwellers
hand-me-down lots and structures which have had every ounce of housing potential squeezed out of them. The municipal services provided
in a central city neighborhood cannot be ignored in the measurement
of that potential.
2. Incentives To Speculate Have Remained Untouched. Putting
even the best intentioned persons onto lots will not stem the abandonment process. Any meaningful attempt to reach the roots of abandonment must include effective measures to discourage speculators from
their practices. At present, municipal property taxation and federal
income taxation offer incentives that make the continuance of the
speculator's practices worthwhile. Federal income tax formulae, such
as accelerated depreciation allowances and preferential capital gains
treatment, may in fact discourage urban rehabilitation by placing a
premium on neglect.9 2 In general, the Treasury Department is of the
opinion that:
90. The problem goes beyond police or fire protection. As homesteaders repopulate the central city, hospital districts, school districts, sewer districts, etc., will have
to be realigned.
91. See materials cited note 30 supra.
92. For general discussions of the intricacies of the federal income tax as applied
to housing before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, see U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 438-51 (1969); Blum & Dunham, Income Tax Law and
the Slums: Some Further Reflections, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 447 (1960); Sporn, Slums
and the Income Tax: A Brief Rejoinder, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 454 (1960); Sporn, Some
Contributions of the Income Tax Law to the Growth and Prevalence of Slums, 59

COLUM. L. REv. 1026 (1959). For a discussion of the impact of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, see Slitor, Tax Incentives and Urban Blight, TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
SYmPOSIUm ON TAx INCENTIVES 257 (1971); Surrey, The Tax Reform Act of 1969Tax Deferral and Tax Shelters, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 307 (1971).
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The present treatment seems to create a tax environment favorable
to frequent turnover which tends to discourage long-range "stewardship" and adequate maintenance; it also encourages thin equities
and unsound financial structures which could
topple if the market
93
for real estate and rental housing weakened.
Simultaneously, municipal property taxes offer incentives which
completely thwart policies designed to encourage the maintenance and
improvement of structures. For example, property taxes are assessed as
4
a function of the market value of both the land and improvements.
Such a tax on the worth of the repairs, and renovations produces dysfunctional land-use results. By taxing these improvements, the homeowner and speculator alike are penalized for rehabilitation of the
premises 5
The Ordinance provides temporary relief to the homesteader by
granting a two year exemption from property taxation. The exemption
clearly will aid the homesteader, but it also exacerbates the inequity of
this system of taxation. It establishes a discriminatory system of selective exemptions for homestead applicants without regard to the need
to find adequate housing for all. William Slayton has presented the
equitable objections to using tax abatement programs as a reward for
home improvement.
This [tax abatement] proposal is a misuse of the taxing power and it
it also discriminatory. It grants no tax relief to the property owner
who maintains his property and benefits the property owner
who has allowed his property to deteriorate. It also violates the basic
principle of property tax; namely, that the incident of the tax should
be based upon the value of the property owned. It is also a hidden
subsidy in that it seemingly encourages action without cost to the
city. In fact, it is both a cost to the city and-a cost, ifn-terms of
increased load, to the property owners who have consistently maintained their property. 96
93. U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 443 (1969).
94. Delogu, The Taxing Power as a Land Use Control Device, 45 DEN. L.J. 279,
281-82 (1968).
95. Senator Goodell concludes:
Since the landlord finds that at least 25% of his operating expenses are taken
up with taxes, he does not want to increase this expense and add to a deficit.
Therefore, improvements axe delayed if not postponed indefinitely.
1 Hearings 843.
96. Slayton, State and Local Incentives and Techniques for Urban Renewal, 25
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 793, 799 (1960).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

The property tax system can be changed to avoid discrimination
and penalizing improvements. In pursuit of a more logical tax system,
municipalities (but not Philadelphia) are considering Henry George's
theory of site value taxation.97 Arguments both favorable and unfavorable to the adoption of site value taxation indicate the complexity of
the issue.98 Under a site value tax, the structure on the premises would
be ignored and only the market value of the land would be assessed.
Supporters of George's theories argue that by taxing only land, owners
are not penalized for improvements. Property taxes would thus be determined without regard to whether a structure existed or its state of
repair; the land's utility would be the only factor relevant to taxation.
For example, a lot in a midtown business district would be assessed at
a higher value than an identical lot in a lower income neighborhood,
regardless of whether the former was used as a parking area and the
latter as a site for a well-maintained and highly profitable multiple
dwelling.
There is an additional rationale for adopting site value taxation;
it would penalize the under-use or the non-use of property. The owner
of a vacant lot would pay as much in taxes as the owner of an adjacent
lot with an income-producing structure. With the emphasis on land
utilization, the incentive to buy and hold vacant land in residential
neighborhoods would thus be destroyed.
B. The Homesteader Cannot Succeed
One is forced to be pessimistic about the prospects for the success
of the urban homesteading program in Philadelphia. The city has ac97. Henry George's major treatises on site value taxation are H. GEORGE, PROORESS
(1911) and H. GEORGE, OUR LAND AND LAND POLICY (1871). See also C.
BAKER, HENRY GEORGE (1955).
98. For other arguments in support of George's theories, see Hagman, The Single
Tax and Land-Use Planning:-Henry George Updated, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 762 (1965);
Howarth, Site Value Taxation: A Solution to Allocation Problems in the Taxation of
Real Estate, 47 MASS. L.Q. 28 (1962); Orr, The Incidence of Differential Property
Taxes on Urban Housing, 21 NAT. TAx J. 253 (1968); Note, Site Value Taxation:
Economic Incentives and Land Use Planning, 9 HARv. J. LEoIS. 115 (1972). For criticisms of George's theories, see Harrison, Housing Rehabilitation and the Pittsburgh
Graded Property Tax, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv. 213 (1964); Richmond, The Theory &
Practice of Site Value Taxation in Pittsburgh, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 57Tu ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL Tax ASSOCIATION 259 (1964); Walker, A Land Tax
Isn't the Way to More Rational Land Use, 2 REAL ESTATE REV. 100 (1972); Walker,
Impact of Taxing Practiceson Land-Use Problems, 77 INST. PLAN. & ZONING 39 (1962);
Comment, Toward Optimal Land Use Planning,55 CAL. L. REv. 856 (1967).
AND POVERTY
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knowledged its inability to deal with the abandonment problem and
all of the massive federal housing programs of past years have not significantly altered the face of the central city. Indeed the draftsmen of
the Ordinance unwittingly prophesized the probable fortunes of the
program in a prefatory comment which reads: "private or governmental development of the vacant ground or structures located thereon is
economically unfeasible."' 9 Does the Ordinance contain a magic formula which will transform the city through the efforts of the twentieth
century pioneers where all others have failed? A comparison of the kind
of applicants the city hopes to attract provides a partial answer to this
inquiry. Further insight into the deficiencies of the program can be
had by examining the financial incentives and assistance urban homesteading offers, or more appropriately, fails to offer.
It is one thing to draw a profile of the type of applicant that is
sought by Philadelphia, yet another to anticipate the type of individual that will actually participate in the program. The ideal applicant is required to demonstrate financial ability or construction proficiency. The established criteria will be satisfied by a person with sufficient means to invest at least $8,000 in rehabilitation or with skills in
a building trade or commitments from friends with such skills. 100
In light of the fact that Philadelphia has not yet begun its program, it is impossible to accurately assess how realistic the criteria are,
however it seems unlikely that they can be stringently applied. Although a large number of preferred applicants will be attracted to the
program initially, it is improbable that more than a few of them will
be willing to live in a ghetto environment.' 0 It is more likely that
99. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
100. See materials cited note 30 supra.
101. Recent articles concerning the Wilmington program would appear to conflict with the presumption that few applications will come from the middle and upper
classes. Its first homesteader is a tax attorney moving to Wilmington from outside the
state. Other homesteaders include students, nurses and longshoremen. N.Y. Times, Sept.
16, 1973, at 1, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1. However, there
are factors which limit the usefulness of comparisons of the programs in Wilmington
and Philadelphia. For one, the population of Wilmington as of the 1970 census was
80,836, down 16.1 percent from the previous census in 1960. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAc 692 (27th ed. D. Golenpaul ed. 1973). The population of Philadelphia as of
the same date was 1,950,098, down only 2.6 percent from 1960. Id. at 691. There are
approximately 1,500 abandoned houses in Wilmington according to the Wall Street
Journal, supra, as opposed to 35,000 in Philadelphia. Interview. The sheer size of Philadelphia's central city would be sufficient justification for the Wilmington homesteaders
to steer clear of the Philadelphia program. Add to that the clearly identifiable ghetto
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the majority of the applicants will be poor blacks who have been
trapped in the inner city.10 2 Of this group most will be renters or people dissatisfied with the homes they now own. They will have little if
any savings, will need assistance in obtaining mortgage financing and
probably will be judgment debtors.10 3 The benefits of urban homesteading will prove elusive for both the community and the judgment
debtor. For every cent of equity accumulated by this homesteader, he
will be liable to his judgment creditor for an equal amount. Unless a
homestead exemption is recognized by the state legislature, the incentive to improve the property will be lacking and the city will incur the
risk of further abandonments resulting from the actions of creditors.
Historically, homestead exemptions have been inseparable from
the granting of free land. 0 4 Congress recognized the need for some
form of homestead protection in the enactment of the Homestead Act
of 1862:
And be it further enacted, That no lands acquired under the provi-

sions of this act shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of
in Philadelphia and the Wilmington program, based on the need to rejuvenate a deteriorating section of a small community, becomes almost totally irrelevant. For whatever it is worth, the Wilmington program has suffered a slight setback. One disgruntled homesteader gave his house back to the city, causing a small furor. Oliphant,
Can Urban Homesteading Be an Idea Whose Time Has Finally Come?, PLANNING,
Feb. 1974, at 3.
102. Sengstock & Sengstock, Homeownership: A Goal for All Americans, 46 J.
URBAN L. 313 (1969). Supporting the theory that the majority of ghetto dwellers rent
not out of choice, but rather of necessity, is a survey of 103 low and middle income
renting families in Detroit. The survey found that 59 percent wanted to own a single
family home, including 42 percent of those with incomes below $7,000. Id. at 322
(Table I). Sixty-four percent of those non-owners who wished to own gave economic
feasons as the sole reason why they did not then own. Id. at 323 (Table II). The
reasons as the sole reason why they did not. Id. at 323 (Table II). The reasons given
most for wanting to own were space, security of continued occupancy, privacy and
equity accumulation. The growth of equity in one's dwelling serves as a replacement
for equity usually represented by savings accounts or investments. Id. at 326-44.
103. The conclusions expressed are based on the writer's personal experiences in
these investigations. Statistical data of this kind are nonexistent, thus reliance on logical
and probable assumptions is necessary. The Buffalo Task Force on Urban Blight also
sought financial information concerning the owners of vacant and dilapidated buildings. Each owner was checked for all outstanding judgments, liens and statements
of credit. For a further description of the task force's work, see note 78 supra.
104. C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 286-87 (1968). Homestead exemptions from attachment were first utilized in the Republic of Texas in 1829. Id. at 286.
Their purpose was to "assure a permanent home to the members of a family by setting
apart property belonging to the head of the family . . . and immunizing this property
from the claims of general creditors and . . . misfortunes ....
" 2 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1263 (recomp. ed. 1966).
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any debt or debts contracted prior to the issuing of any patent
thereof. 0 5

Contemporary federal homestead exemptions are limited to debts acquired before the certificate of patent is issued, 10 6 except such debts
as are required in carrying out improvements. Congressional intent
was not construed by the courts to allow such settlers to make unlimited purchases for their homestead without creating the legal obli07
gation to pay for such goods and services.
By no means can the city be faulted for the omission of such provisions in the Philadelphia Homestead Ordinance, for the power to

grant such exemptions resides with the Pennsylvania General Assembly. That body has seen fit to allow judgment creditors to attach or
execute on any and all titles vested in the debtor. 08 Therefore, the
city of Philadelphia cannot offer its homesteaders meaningful protec-

tion that will put their property beyond the reach of even a few
creditors 0
The question of whether the program will prove economically

feasible to applicants can be addressed by exploring the availability of
home improvement loans and the average cost of renovations. The
Ordinance is completely silent on the subject of home improvement
loans."10 No funds have been appropriated to grant direct financial as-

sistance to needy applicants. Philadelphia has so far done nothing more
than promise to refer homesteaders to appropriate federal rehabilitation

and mortgage programs"' or to sympathetic banks. As William Grigsby,
a University of Pennsylvania urban-planning professor stated: "Unless
there is a public subsidy, the homesteader is being led into a bad
105. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 4, 12 Stat. 393 (1863).

106. 43 U.S.C. § 175 (1970).
107. Wright v. Walker, 31 Wyo. 233, 225 P. 25 (1923).
108. "In Pennsylvania, homesteads are not beyond the reach of execution creditors."
In re Elliot, 83 F. Supp. 771, 773 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1948). See also Mantz v. Kistler, 221
Pa. 142, 70 A. 545 (1908).
109. In New York, the legislature has recognized a $2,000 exemption. N.Y. Cxv.
PRAC. LAW § 5206 (McKinney 1962). If the property is valued at more than $2,000,
the judgment creditor can force a sale of the property, and have access to all but
$2,000 of the proceeds. Owing to the average value of land, the exemption is conceded
to be of very little importance today. 2 WARREN'S WEED ON TEE NEW YORK LAW OF

REAL. PROPERTY, Execution Sale §§ 2.03-.10 (0. Warren ed. 1970). But see CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1973) (the California homestead exemption is $20,000).
110. Ordinance § 6(H).

111, THIE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN PROBLEMS, A DECENT HOME, pt. II, at 66-70 (1968); see Note, Building Abandonment, 16 N.Y.L.F.
798, 845-46, 849-51 (1970).
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deal." "1 It is totally unrealistic to expect any but a handful of urban
homesteaders to finance the project themselves. The undertaking is
not an inexpensive one and the cost of labor and materials is rising
rapidly. Rehabilitation through contract labor is roughly estimated to
cost from $15,000 to $20,000 per house; rehabilitation done solely by
the homesteader will cost from $7,000 to $8,000.113 In some cases, completion of rehabilitation within the specified time will necessitate leaves
of absence from jobs or at least irregular working hours. As a homesteader in Wilmington described the demands placed on her family:
"We are ready to drop out of the world for 18 months to fix the
place up." 114
In addition to the property tax abatement incentive, the urban
homesteader is granted a limited exemption from compliance with the
housing code. Section 6 (D) of the Ordinance provides a two-year
exemption from enforcement of sections 200 through 207 of the Housing Code for homesteaders in the process of renovation. Those provisions apply primarily to the width and depth of drainage spouts in the
bathtub and the necessity for three piece bathroom units. 11 To bring
a dwelling into full compliance might otherwise require major replumbing or an entirely new bathroom. The cost of such renovations
would be too high a price to pay for the marginal difference it might
make to the health and safety of the residents. Such exemptions can
make or break a homesteader in attempting to renovate his property
and as such represent a truly new outlook towards code enforcement."10
112. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1. See also Statement of William Ross, Deputy Secretary for Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation of HUD,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1968):
While residents of the urban core have need for credits to finance
the rebuilding or rehabilitation of residential structures ... they have an even
greater need for the requisite equity capital or downpayments that make
such credit possible. It would be fool hardy for private financial institutions on
their own to provide 100 percent loans to enable a ghetto resident to acquire
a home. Unless the . . . homebuyer has a personal financial stake in the . . .
home, the private lender is unlikely to make a loan, especially to inexperienced
borrowers.

Id.
113. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
114. Wall Street Journal, Sept, 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
115. Interview.
116. Jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania have endorsed this outlook. In People
v. Rowen, 9 N.Y.2d 732, 174 N.E.2d 331, 214 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1961), rev'g mem. 11
App. Div. 2d 670, 204 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1960), the New York Court of Appeals
reversed, without opinion, the conviction of a landlord who failed to improve his prop-
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While homesteaders will no doubt appreciate not having to immediately cart new bathtubs into their homes, the Council did not go fai
enough in granting meaningful exemptions. The city, as a display of
its own commitment to the spirit of homesteading, should have waived
or modified most of the code, except for provisions absolutely necessary for safety and health. For example, the city council could have
allowed the use of plastic rather than metal pipes, sinks, and reinforcement material. 1 17 A more thorough and rigorous examination of housing code provisions might reveal a number of modifications which
would save costs without sacrificing the public well being. Undoubtedly
several of the present code requirements are costly and antiquated in
light of recent advances in engineering and design.
As additional incentives, the council could have awarded grantsin-aid to its homesteaders to cover the cost of permits for construction
and repairs. For example, in Buffalo, New York, the costs of sewage,
water, street, and assorted building permits carry a base cost of $80.
Another cost-saving device would be for the city to engage in masspurchasing, acquiring at volume prices the supplies that will be most
needed by the homesteaders. Bricks, cement, roofing, insulation, etc.,
could be passed on at no profit, thereby assuring the homesteaders a
steady supply of materials at fixed prices.1 8
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Philadelphia Urban Homesteading Ordinance is woefully
lacking in the legal and economic machinery needed to make it successful. This Comment is not meant as a broadside volley against the
erty in order to comply with the code. The cost of the necessary improvements would
have run in excess of $42,000; the two buildings involved were valued at $30,000. None
of the required improvements would have put his tenants in a safer or healthier condition than before. The court of original jurisdiction had fined the defendant $50 and the
appellate division had affirmed. By reversing, the court of appeals forsook an entrenched
doctrine that economic considerations are irrelevant in determining whether code requirements will be enforced. See generally Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement:
Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUm. L. RV. 1254, 1270-72 (1966).
117. Homestead advocates in Philadelphia unsuccessfully sought specific code
waivers along these lines. Note, Urban Homesteading, MuNicr'Ar. ATT'Y, Oct. 1973, at
196.
118. In one FHA project, volume buying resulted in a reduction in the amount
spent on ranges and refrigerators from 2.41 percent of the total building cost to 1.6
percent. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
HOUSING FIT TOGETHER 31 (1969).

PROBLEmS, How THE MANY COSTS OF
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competence of the Philadelphia City Council. Rather it is designed to
demonstrate the city's lack of control over its own destiny. Philadelphia simply does not have the authority or the resources to implement
a comprehensive program to deal with urban decay. Because of these
limitations, the Philadelphia City Council has not come forth with a
plan which will generate the "stability, .... dignity" or civic pride expected of it. What this hapless scheme will produce is more victims:
the applicants who attempt to fulfill their contracts with the city by
living in a hostile environment.
The Homestead Ordinance alone cannot begin to solve the socioeconomic problems of the inner city. An unoccupied house is only a
symptom of a complex breakdown in the market system. If the flood
of abandonment is to be checked, an attack must be made on the factors which generate widespread speculation. Also, all owners must be
forced to maintain and renovate their structures while they are still of
housing value. The city will never stem abandonment if the only
method it utilizes is to wait for abandonment, foreclose, and then resell to homesteaders. As a partial incentive, the city could include more
dwellings than just the homestead properties in the tax abatement
program.
Under the Urban Homestead Ordinance, the Homestead Board
will have discretion in determining which applicants are financially
acceptable. It is urged that the Board not choose solely on the basis
of fixed measures of income or credit, but rather that it look to the
applicant's commitment to success. The financial situation of each individual should be closely scrutinzed in an effort to distinguish those
with a prodigal or wasteful financial history, 11 from those whose poor
financial record is the result of exploitative commercial activity indigenous to the ghetto, necessary deficit spending, or loss of adequate
income due to lack of training or education.1 0 Thus the program would
remain accessible to at least some of those in desperate need of adequate
housing.
To enable its cities to implement a comprehensive attack on urban
decay, the Commonwealth would be well advised to recognize a home119. Such a history could result from poor or no financial self-discipline, unrealistic or overconsumption or illegal commercial activity.
120. See, e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, THE, PooR PAY MORE (1968), in which the author
offers case after case of lower income persons being exploited by vicious credit schemes,
disguised as standard business practice by the core area merchant.
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stead exemption as does New York.' 2 ' However, Pennsylvania should
consider either an increase in the amount allowed for that exemption,
or else totally reject a fixed sum in lieu of a flexible standard adaptable
to economic conditions and/or the nature of the debt being pursued.
Raising the fixed sum from the New York limit of $2,000 to a level of,
perhaps $20,000, as California has done, 12 2 would create a more realistic protective device. Alternatively, such an exemption could be
limited to the lower of either a fixed sum or an amount equal to the
value of the structure, indispensable fixtures, and the land needed to
satisfy the minimum lot requirement. The statute should contain an
exception allowing execution on debts arising from post-acquisition
expenditures on the house or lot.m
Despite its faults, the Philadelphia Ordinance has redeeming political value in that it has done more to draw attention to the abandonment process than any other recent event. The Urban Homestead
Ordinance can be viewed as a much needed reactivation of a concept
of land-use policy which encourages the individual and the community
to cooperate on equal footing towards the salvation of the urban
landscape.
SHELLY ScoTr FRIEDMAN

121. N.Y. Civ. Pa~c. LAw § 5206(a) (McKinney 1972).
122. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1973).
123. See C. BERGER, supranote 104, at 286-89.

